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currently divided on whether there is a positive or negative relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth, and it appears that this is in large part due to 
inconsistent measures of fiscal decentralisation. In this paper, fiscal decentralisation in 
Vietnam will be examined, with a view to developing a fiscal decentralisation index that 
accounts for both the fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments to 
compare the degree of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam with that of a range of other 
countries. This will facilitate subsequent (and hopefully definitive) investigations of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. 
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I. Introduction   
 
Vietnam is a developing country in the South East Asia region with per capita income 
of US$ 542 in 2004 and a public sector that accounts for about one quarter of the national 
economy. The country has faced many challenges in relation to the process of economic 
growth as a fully independent nation since liberation on 30 April 1975 and the proclamation 
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 25 April 1976. The economy had been thoroughly 
run down after 30 years of war with two completely different economic systems: the North 
with the highly centralised and planned regime and the South with the market regime. Since 
reunification, Vietnam has attempted to integrate itself further with the world economy.  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam, with a 
view to developing a fiscal decentralisation index (FDI) to compare Vietnam with a range of 
other countries. The paper is organised into seven sections. Following this Introduction, 
Section II briefly discusses the history of Vietnam and the current structure of the Vietnam 
State. Also, economic growth and fiscal changes in Vietnam are briefly discussed. The 
distinct notions of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments 
(SNGs) – two cornerstones of fiscal federalism literature - are discussed in section III. 
Section IV examines the current arrangement of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam and 
provides preliminary comments on its current situation. Development of the FDI is outlined 
in section V. Then, the FDIs for Vietnam and selected ASEAN and OECD countries are 
calculated in section VI. Main conclusions are included in section VII.   
 
II.  Fiscal changes and economic growth in Vietnam from 1975 to 2004 
 
1.  Vietnam’s history and the current structure of the government  
 
Vietnam’s history has reflected many political, social and economic transformations. 
However, until the mid nineteenth century, the single defining historical feature was the 
successive sequence of feudal dynasties. In all these feudal dynasties, highly centralised 
administrative structures were prominent. However, this long historical tradition was 
fundamentally changed in 1858 when France colonised Vietnam. On the 2 September 1945, 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established and the French colonialists invaded the 
country again. The war of resistance between 1945 - 1954 was ended by the defeat of the 
French in the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu. As a result, the Geneva Agreement on 
Vietnam was signed in 1954. According to this Agreement, the country was temporarily 
partitioned into two parts (North Vietnam and South Vietnam) by the seventeenth parallel 
and should be reunified within two years through a general election held all over Vietnam.  
However, this did not eventuate and the country was remained divided. National 
reunification and independence were realised on 30 April 1975. Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam was subsequently formed on 25 April 1976. The history of the nation has turned 
into the new page, with the last 30 years of the century of peace time largely devoted to 
developing the economy.   
 
Vietnam is a socialist country with the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party. 
The present structure of the State system in Vietnam is defined by the Vietnamese 
Constitution (1992) and a range of non-constitutional statutes. The National Assembly is the 
highest representative office of the people, the highest institution of state power of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The National Assembly has 450 members who are popularly   2
elected for the five-year term. Among these members, the National Assembly appoints the 
President. The President is the Head of the State who represents the Nation in internal and 
foreign affairs and is elected among members of the National Assembly. The President acts 
as the head of the State. The head of the government is the Prime Minister who is proposed 
by the President and elected by the National Assembly. 
 
The administrative structure of the country at local authority level is organised into 
three different sub-levels: province, district and commune. There are currently 64 provinces, 
in which five large cities are granted a provincial status. They are Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, 
Haiphong, Danang and Cantho. These provinces are divided into 611 districts which are, in 
turn, subdivided into 10,602 communes (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). At every level of 
subnational governments, there is legislative authority - People’s Council, and executive 
authority - People’s Committee, who is appointed by the People’s Council at the same level 
of governments. Although the People’s Council and the People’s Committee are set up as 
two different bodies, they usually have the overlapping members (i.e. some members at 
People’s Council are also members at People’s Committee, except for some positions). 
    
2.  Summary of economic growth and fiscal changes from 1975 to 2004  
 
Changes in fiscal environment embodied in the history of economic growth in 
Vietnam can be reviewed for specific segmented periods. The following periods are 
considered because there have been significant changes in economic and fiscal policies. 
Also, after reunification, the government prepared and implemented “Five-Year Socio-
economic Development Plan” (FYP) for every five years, starting from 1976.  
 
2.1  Economic growth for the period from 1976 to 2004 
 
For the period from 1976 to 1985, Vietnam was a centrally planned economy. This 
period was represented by the FYPs from 1976 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1985. The broad 
objectives of these plans were to create the transformation of the economy from small-scale 
to large-scale production with the emphasis on heavy industry and agriculture. In addition, 
these plans were also intended to stabilise and improve living standard, reorganize and 
develop production (Vo, 1990). These goals were seen as over ambitious and infeasible. The 
results for economic growth for these FYPs can be found as follows. 
  TABLE  1 
  ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES 
      Percentage rates of growth 
      GDP  Agriculture  Industry 
FYP 1976 - 1980       
  Plan  13 - 14  8 - 10  16 - 18 
 Actual  0.4  1.9  3.3 
FYP 1980 - 1985       
  Plan  4.5 - 5.0  6 - 7  4 - 5 
   Actual  6.4  5.3  9.3 
Source: Fforde and De Vylder (1996, p. 167) and Arkadie and Mallon (2003, p. 28).  
 
In December 1986, intensively comprehensive programs of economic reform were 
initiated as represented by the FYP for the period from 1986 to 1990. This reform explicitly 
recognised the irrelevance of the centrally planned economy in Vietnam. Since then,   3
Vietnam has been characterised as a multi-sector economy which follows market-based 
operations. Between 1991 and 2000, there was a period of extended and comprehensive 
economic reform. This period was represented by two FYPs from 1991 to 1995 and from 
1996 to 2000. The goals were to increase the annual growth rate to around 7.5% and double 
capita income by 2000 from the 1990’s level (MOFA, 2003). 
  
   Economic growth and inflation over the period of the FYPs in Vietnam (1976 – 
2000) can be seen in Table 2: 
 
   TABLE  2     
GROWTH & INFLATION OF THE FIVE YEAR PLANS 
          
Period  Inflation 
(CPI)  GDP Agriculture  Services Industry 
1976-1980 21.2  0.4  1.9  -0.1  3.3 
1981-1985 74.2  6.4  5.3  4.7  9.3 
1986-1990 298.7  3.9  3.7  8.7  4.7 
1991-1995 23.5  8.2  4.3  9.5  12.6 
1996-2000 3.4  7.0  3.9  7.3  12.2 
Source: Arkadie and Mallon, (2003, p. 28).        
 
Since 2001, the economy was marked as the period of industrialisation and 
modernisation with the goal to become an industrialised country by 2020. It is expected that 
GDP in 2010 will be doubled that of 2000, with a strong transformation of the structure of 
the economy, particularly focusing on industry, construction and services. For the 
transformation of the structure, by the year 2020, agriculture accounts for 16-17% GDP, 
industry from 40-41% GDP and approximately 42-43% GDP for services. In addition, it is 
expected that the ratio of domestic saving rises over 30% of GDP (IMF, 2004). 
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2.2  Significant fiscal changes in Vietnam for the period from 1976 to 2004 
  
The degree of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam has changed over the last 30 years as 
laws and regulations have been altered. The most fundamental legislative initiation to 
influence fiscal decentralisation can be traced back to Resolution No. 108/CP on 13 May   4
1978 in the Five Year Plan (FYP) for 1976 – 1980. Under this regulation, SNGs’ revenues, 
which were constrained by their spending responsibilities
2, included fixed owned source 
revenue and shared taxes. In the case of shared taxes, the tax sharing rates with jurisdictions 
were predetermined by the national government. Fiscal transfers were arranged if SNGs 
were in need after using up all revenue from their owned source and shared taxes. As a 
result, revenue and spending from SNGs increased by 43.5% and 1.5% in 1980 compared 
with those in 1976. In short, the first FYP after national reunification laid the foundation for 
fiscal decentralisation by assigning significant expenditure responsibilities to SNGs but it 
did not assign commensurate taxing powers to them.  
 
Resolution 138-HDBT on 19 November 1983 in the FYP for 1981 to 1985 could be 
seen as a challenge. SNGs’ revenues, which were no longer constrained, were determined 
by the economic capability of locality. If SNGs revenue collected exceeded the assigned 
amount, SNGs’ budgets received more from the exceeded amount. Tax sharing rates were 
the same across provinces. However, localities in financial difficulty were eligible to receive 
more revenues from shared taxes by increasing the sharing rates. With this regulation, 24 
provinces were financially independent from the national government in 1988. In the FYP 
for the period from 1986 to 1990, Resolution 186/HDBT on 27 November 1989 was 
important for fiscal decentralisation because it turned to ensure that SNGs spending would 
be assigned based on their fiscal capacity of taxing powers. Also, tax sharing rates were 
different across provinces because a simple formula has been used depending on the SNGs’ 
owned source revenue and spending assignment. When SNGs revenue is greater than their 
spending responsibilities, the surplus must be transferred to the national government. As a 
result, there were 14 out of 44 provinces contributed to the total consolidated government 
budget.   
 
1996 can be considered as the first year in its fiscal history when Vietnam issued and 
implemented the first Law on State budget
3. This Law is effectively seen as a fiscal 
constitution for budget management in Vietnam. Law 1996 stated revenue and spending 
responsibilities for the national government as well as for subnational governments. Two 
years after issuance of the State budget law, in 1998, a revised budget law was issued. There 
were almost no changes of principles of the issue. The only changes were that the 
assignments of revenue and spending responsibilities to subnational governments were 
extended. The Law did not mention spending responsibility and tax revenue for SNGs at 
district and commune levels. This was implicitly understood that the government at 
provincial level had to make all these related decisions.  
 
Various recent policies have confirmed the extent of fiscal decentralisation process in 
Vietnam. Some typical ones are Decree No. 93/2001/ND-CP on 12 December 2001 which 
allowed Ho Chi Minh City to implement the policy of management decentralisation as the 
pioneering city in Vietnam. In addition, with Decree No. 141/2003/ND-CP on 20 November 
2003, the issuances of urban bonds from SNGs governments at provincial levels are 
officially permitted. This is the basis and official foundation for subnational borrowing. 
After that, by many regulations, after the success of pioneering program from Ho Chi Minh 
                                                 
2 It means that SNGs revenue was not decided based on respective jurisdiction’s capacity of fiscal resources 
but it was determined based on assigned spending responsibilities to the jurisdiction from the national 
government.   
3 In this context, this means total consolidated government budget.   5
City, further decentralisation of taxing powers and spending responsibilities have been 
assigned to Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi and Haiphong – the three largest cities in Vietnam. 
 
In conclusion, since the first Five Year Plan after the national reunification, Vietnam’s 
fiscal arrangements have become progressively more decentralised. The process initially 
focused on the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, it then turned to the taxing power 
assignments to subnational governments. Once these two important and first- order issues 
have been implemented, fiscal transfers from the national government and SNGs 
borrowings were also considered. Starting with the largest city in terms of size, economic 
growth, per capita income, and population, Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam has shown its 
prudent steps to the process of fiscal decentralisation. Experiences from Ho Chi Minh city 
have then been applied to other selected cities before popularly implemented for the whole 
nation.  
 
III.  Fiscal federalism: Fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance 
 
1. Background   
 
Tiebout’s classic article “A pure theory of local expenditures” was published in 1956. 
Over the next half a century, the field of fiscal federalism has developed substantially and 
contributed to a large body of literature on fiscal decentralisation. Seminal studies by 
Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) laid the foundation for the significant 
discussions of fiscal decentralisation. Tiebout (1956) introduced the notion of local public 
expenditures to demonstrate that, in a fiscally decentralised country, perfect mobility of 
citizens between localities will result in competition among localities in providing goods 
and services; and, as a result, production efficiency will be enhanced. In short, Tiebout saw 
fiscal decentralisation as a mechanism for overcoming the problem of free riding in public 
economics. Three years later, Musgrave (1959) laid the general foundations for modern 
public finance theory, stressing that the best allocation of scarce resources will be achieved 
whenever preferences and tastes of local citizens have been met. In addition, Oates (1972) 
argued that there should be variations in the provisions of public goods and services from 
the governments since inhabitants have different tastes in their consumption patterns. From 
this perspective, subnational governments (SNGs) will better understand their local citizens 
in comparison to the national government which always provides the same bundles of 
goods across regions without regard to regional variations in tastes and preferences. In 
addition, if the national government is the only provider of public goods and services for 
the community, there will be no incentive for it to improve production efficiency due to 
non existence of competition, whereas subnational governments have to face the fierce 
competitions from neighbourhoods. Oates formalised treatment of the issue by developing 
the first decentralisation theorem: 
 
“For a public good – the consumption of which is defined over geographical 
subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of 
output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or the 
respective local government – it will always be more efficient (or at least as 
efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for 
their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any 
specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions” (Oates, 1972, p. 35).   
   6
For whatever expectations on fiscal decentralisation are, one of the most important 
goals needs to achieve from and by fiscal decentralisation is to attain economic growth. 
Recent researches have attempted to clarify the possible relationship between the two 
variables of interest – fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. In these studies, two 
different methodological approaches - The endogenous growth model of Barro (1990) and 
Augmented Solow (1956) model of economic growth; and diverse designs of fiscal 
decentralisation dimensions have been used. There have been around six cross-country 
studies and several ones on particular economies: three for China, two for the US, one for 
India, one for Germany, one for Russia (Breuss and Eller, 2004). However, in general, 
evidences from both theoretical and empirical analyses have provided mixed results. 
 
The main basis for supporting fiscal decentralisation centres on the economic 
efficiency gains. Efficiency may basically come from an efficient allocation of scarce 
resources as well as fierce competition among subnational governments. Efficiency 
improvement will clearly increase GDP. However, it is unclear whether this result is a one-
off increase in GDP but no on-going increase in the growth rate, or both a one-off increase 
and on-going increase in the growth rate. Static economic theory provides a compelling case 
for a one-off increase in GDP, the case for economic growth as well depends on dynamic 
issues and dynamic theory which is less well established because many different factors 
may influence to economic growth.         
  
2.  Fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance 
 
Subsequent to Oates’ theorem, discussions on fiscal decentralisation have centred on 
four main areas: the assignment of expenditure responsibility; revenue assignment (taxing 
powers); intergovernmental fiscal transfers; and subnational borrowing
4. Conceptually, 
these topics can be divided into two broad categories: (i) fiscal autonomy of subnational 
governments; and (ii) fiscal importance of subnational governments. In this regard, fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs mainly deals with the assignment of taxing powers, including 
supplementary tools such as intergovernmental fiscal transfers, subnational borrowing and 
the assignment of responsibility for public provision of goods and services, whereas fiscal 
importance is directly connected with the level of expenditure responsibility of SNGs 
relative to the level of all government expenditures. 
 
2.1  Fiscal autonomy of SNGs 
 
Agreement on the distribution of taxing powers is difficult since the players (national 
government and SNGs) approach their respective powers from two different perspectives. 
While the national government continues keeping important tax sources for economic 
stabilisation and income redistribution, SNGs focus on taxing powers to generate stable 
revenue to implement their duties in provision of public goods and services which are 
fundamental to community welfare such as healthcare, education and public order
5. If tax 
assignment is extensive, the gap between spending responsibility and taxing power of SNGs 
will be minimised or eliminated, leading to fiscal autonomy of SNGs
6. Fiscal autonomy of 
                                                 
4 See in Bird (1999 and 2000), Martinez-Vazquez (2001), McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (2004), Musgrave 
(1983), Shah (2004), Ter-Minassian (1996). 
5 See also in Bird (1999 and 2000); McLure (1998) and Musgrave (1983). 
6 If debts of SNGs are zero, then fiscal autonomy is associated with SNGs expenditures being fully funded 
from owned source revenues.   7
SNGs implies that, to some extent, SNGs can arrange their owned source revenue by 
exercising their taxing powers to cover costs occurring in the provision of public goods and 
services. As a result, intergovernmental fiscal transfers will no longer be a significant source 
of revenue for SNGs. It should be noted, however, that even in the absence of fiscal 
transfers (“grants”), SNGs will not enjoy full fiscal autonomy if they receive taxes or 
revenue shares directly from the national government when all tax bases and rates are 
centrally determined (McLure, 2001). The necessary condition for a significant level of 
fiscal autonomy is that SNGs themselves have the discretion to set the tax rates and/ or 
bases (so that they can adjust their revenue by varying the rates and/ or the bases) in 
response to fiscal demand for publicly provided goods and services. If this is not the case, 
flexibility and the potential for creativity by SNGs for the efficient provision of public 
goods and services is limited.   
 
In transition periods for developing countries, “piggybacking” is a common practice to 
grant fiscal autonomy for SNGs by allowing them to set the rates as the surcharge on the 
bases which are determined by the national government. Also, tax rates set by SNGs are 
only allowed to vary within the band centrally determined which obviously acts as a 
bounded constraint on SNGs’ fiscal autonomy, resulting in only partial fiscal autonomy. 
However, piggybacking can be difficult to implement in developing countries, mainly 
because the marginal tax rates of the national government are usually set very high, so that 
there is no room for an additional SNG “surcharge” on the same tax bases.  
 
In the event of a long-period mismatch between SNGs’ spending responsibility and 
revenue capacity, vertical fiscal imbalance
7 will inevitably emerge and must be managed by 
the national government through intergovernmental fiscal grants and advances. If SNGs are 
given adequately fiscal autonomy, ex-post vertical fiscal imbalance is expected to be 
minimised before any fiscal transfer takes place
8. However, it is also argued that if the 
national government focuses exclusively on filling the gap of vertical fiscal issues, this 
decision may reduce the incentive for the SNGs to increase their respective taxing powers 
and to manage public spending efficiently (Ahmad and Craig, 1997). One option for 
reducing the vertical fiscal imbalance without reform of tax assignment is to re-assign some 
spending responsibility for goods and services provision from SNGs to the national 
government. Nevertheless, experience suggests that mismatch between spending and taxing 
will also provide some balancing role for the national government in fiscal transfers (Bird 
and Smart, 2002). 
 
There are a wide range of aims that the national government needs to achieve when 
designing the system of fiscal transfers. From a fiscal autonomy perspective, the principle 
issue is whether fiscal transfers are conditional or unconditional. That is, the extent of 
discretion that SNGs enjoy concerning the expenditure of these transfers. While the issue of 
when to, and how to, equalise transfers is important in its own context, it is generally a 
second order issue for fiscal autonomy
9.  
                                                 
7 Vertical fiscal imbalance implies a mismatch between owned source revenue (excluding grants from other 
levels of governments) and own purpose spending (excluding grants to other levels of governments) for a 
particular level of government (Collins, 2001). 
8 This happens at least for the aggregate of SNGs. It is still possible, of course, for individual SNG to run 
deficits or surpluses, even when the vertical fiscal imbalance to be eliminated between the national 
government and the aggregate of the SNGs.   
9 The system of fiscal equalisation which is a complex issue is beyond the scope of this paper.    8
 
Fiscal autonomy of SNGs is clearly an important feature of fiscal decentralisation. 
Discussion on the degree of fiscal decentralisation of a particular country without dealing 
directly with local fiscal autonomy is only partial. However, fiscal autonomy is only one 
aspect of fiscal decentralisation, which also depends on the proportion of national fiscal 
activity undertaken by SNGs, or their “fiscal importance”. 
 
2.2  Fiscal importance of SNGs 
 
  In theory, the economic performances of the government should become more 
productive, efficient and effective if services are provided by the lowest level of government 
possible. This is known as principle of subsidiarity (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001). While 
foreign policy, defence, immigration, international trade can be best formulated and 
implemented by the national government, SNGs are able to carry out some important tasks 
for provincial communities such as law, order and public safety, education, health policy, as 
well as very local issues such as street lighting system, local sewerage, garbage collection, 
local paper deliveries, etc. Services provided by the national government confirm the law of 
subsidiarity when demand is at a constant level across the various subnational localities. 
However, when demand varies from location to location, national provision to a common 
standard leads to inefficient under-provision, in some areas, and inefficient over-provision, 
in other areas. In short, services provided by the national government assume tastes and 
preferences to be homogeneous across locations and for citizens within locations.  
 
However, SNGs can provide goods and services based on the size of jurisdiction, and 
in accordance with local tastes and preferences (Shah, 2004). If the size of jurisdiction is 
considered, the principle of benefit matching will be achieved because local citizens who 
receive benefits also bear costs. Also, cost for publicly provided goods and services can be 
recovered, at least at the margin, so that the pressures from the lack of financial resources 
for SNGs decrease. As a consequence, services are expected to be provided more 
efficiently. SNGs operate closely to local inhabitants so that they are the sole agents, who 
are in the best position to understand preferences, tastes and amount demanded. It is clear 
that levels of goods and services provided should not be exceeded the amount demanded by 
the community. This can avoid both under or overprovision of public goods and services. 
Moreover, a system of fees, users’ charges can be considered useful and effective for the 
purpose of cost recovered (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004).  
 
On the basis of the law of subsidiarity, one would expect that it is efficient for SNGs 
to account for a significant proportion of fiscal activity across the nation. The larger the 
portion of the spending cake is for SNGs, the higher the degree of fiscal importance is 
granted to them. This needs to be recognised in any index of fiscal decentralisation.  
 
2.3  Theoretical and empirical studies 
 
  The theoretical case for a relatively high degree of fiscal decentralisation outlined in 
2.2 and 2.3 is quite clear. Efficiency has attracted a great attention from policymakers and 
economists. Supports for fiscal decentralisation will become much less persuasive if their 
discussions are separated from the ground of economic efficiency. This implies that 
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efficiency in the provision of public goods and services by SNGs will be translated into an 
one-off GDP increase by reducing and/ or minimising wastages and allocating scarce 
resources in efficient manner. If this is accompanied by greater fiscal competition between 
jurisdictions and resulting an increase in positive fiscal externalities, a higher degree of 
fiscal decentralisation may also be associated with higher rate of economic growth. 
However, it must be cautioned that this conclusion is not yet supported unequivocally by 
empirical studies. This appears, in part, to be due to use of inappropriate indices of fiscal 
decentralisation, which ignore either fiscal authority or fiscal importance of SNGs. This 
matter will be further discussed in section V. 
 
IV.  Vietnam and fiscal decentralisation 
  
After national reunification in 1976, fiscal environment in Vietnam has changed 
significantly. This change can be confirmed in different legal documents governing fiscal 
arrangement issued in the period. It is generally agreed that Vietnam is pursuing a process 
of fiscal decentralisation – at least in terms of increasing the fiscal importance of SNGs
10.  
 
The outcomes of the State budget revenue and expenditure decentralisation in Vietnam 
for the period from 1997 (the first year of implementation of the First Budget Law) to 2004   
are shown in Table 3. Revenues for SNGs have continuously increased, around 30% total 
government revenue for the period. In addition, there has also been an increase in the share 
of subnational expenditures in the total expenditures. The share has been almost 40% for the 
whole period. Even though the concept of fiscal decentralisation has multi-dimensions, from 
the aspects of expenditure and taxing assignments, Vietnam can be considered moderately 
decentralised (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). However, without further consideration of the 
other dimensions, this comment may be misleading.    
 
  TABLE 3 
REVENUE & EXPENDITURE DECENTRALISATION IN VIETNAM 
     1997 1998 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Revenue (VND Billions)  65,352 70,612 78,489 90,749 103,773 121,716 141,930 149,320
Of which:   
  Local budget revenue  19,264 20,280 19,571 22,269 25,463 30,545  38,683 44,743
  Share in total budget revenue  29.5 28.7 24.9 24.5 24.5 25.1  27.3 30.0
% Growth rate (previous year = 100%)                 
  Total budget revenue  4.8 8 11.2 15.6 14.4 17.3  16.6 5.2
  Local budget revenue  8.5 5.3 -3.5 13.8 14.3 20.0  26.6 15.7
Expenditure (VND Billions)  78,057 81,995 95,972 108,961 129,773 148,208 177,150 187,670
Of  which:              
 Local  expenditure  28,039 31,808 39,040 45,082 56,043 64,573  66,254 67,184
  Share in total expenditure  35.9 38.8 40.7 41.4 43.2 43.6  37.4 35.8
                                                 
10 Since Vietnam is a unitary country, the term “SNGs” or “local governments” will be used interchangeably.  10
% Growth rate (previous year = 100%)                 
  Total budget expenditure  10.7 5.0 17.0 13.5 19.1 14.2  19.5 5.9
  Local budget expenditure  19.1 13.4 22.7 15.5 24.3 15.2  2.6 1.5
Fiscal transfers (VND Billions)  9,964 12,290 20,510 26,601 23,553 35,278 38,040 35,048
  % Growth rate (pre. year = 100%)  35.4 23.3 66.9 29.7 -11.5 49.8  7.8 -7.9
  Share in total local expenditure  35.5 38.6 52.5 59.0 42.0 54.6  57.4 52.2




1.  The assignment of expenditure responsibility 
 
The current State budget law indicates responsibilities for expenditure between 
national and local governments. However, these regulations are not clear and overlapping in 
goods and services provision by different levels of governments is not uncommon. This 
violates the principle of clarity and is known as the co-sharing services responsibility. When 
possible, co-sharing responsibility should be avoided because the ambiguity will create 
unnecessary duplication in the provision of public goods and service to local communities, 
and, in turn, negatively affect the efficiency of the spending programs. The other problem 
with co-sharing spending is that this may, intentionally or unintentionally, confuse the 
assignment of responsibility across each level of governments, and therefore accountability 
and transparency may be in danger. Table 3 shows that total SNGs’ expenditure for the 
period is around 40% total government spending. If the dimension of expenditure is used, 
Vietnam is moderately decentralised. It is however cautioned that the majority portion of 
SNGs’ spending is a consequence of national government policy decisions. SNGs have 
limited discretion to decide the spending areas for their locality. In this case, SNGs are only 
spending units. As a result, conclusion of decentralised spending responsibility for SNGs 
can provide misleading information. 
 
2.  Revenue assignment (taxing powers) 
 
Figures in Table 3 indicate that SNGs share of total government revenue is around 
30%. This figure is only partial. For a more complete view on the current status of the 
taxing power assignment in Vietnam, the following factors should be taken into serious 
consideration: firstly, the national government sets all tax bases and rates; secondly, SNGs 
are allowed to autonomously set fees and charges for only revenues that comprise an 
insignificant share of their budget; and thirdly, tax collections are centralised with local tax 
authorities only collecting revenues arising within their administrative regions on the 
national government’s behalf.  
 
Consequently, purely local taxes are extremely limited in Vietnam. Figure 2 below 
shows the relationship between SNG’s expenditures and its respective local taxes. This 
relationship reflects the degree of fiscal imbalances between the national and local 
governments. The sample of nine localities is selected among 64 provinces and cities in 
Vietnam based on the significant portion of local revenue to be transferred to the national 
budget. These cities and provinces are “typical” representatives for fast economic growth at 
regions across the nation, comprising the five big cities which were granted a provincial  11
status, as previously mentioned, and another four big provinces (Khanh Hoa, Dong Nai, 
Binh Duong and Baria – Vung Tau). No provinces experience a fiscal balance. All selected 
provinces experience some degree of fiscal imbalance. This conclusion can be applied for 
the whole Vietnam because the selected localities are the biggest provinces in the country.  
FIGURE 2
FISCAL AUTONOMY OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
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In addition, shared national and subnational taxes also play very important portion in 
local revenues. In the case of Vietnam, SNGs have no discretion to change these bases and 
rates. As a result, SNGs have no power to adjust their revenue even at the margin. Also, it is 
noted that types of taxes to be shared and the proportion in which the taxes are shared are 
set by the national government. Even after the shared taxes take play, majority provinces in 
Vietnam are still in the fiscal imbalance condition as Figure 3 shows below. In this sample, 
only Ho Chi Minh City and Baria – Vung Tau are not in fiscal imbalance. Da Nang, Binh 
Duong and Dong Nai are at the margin whereas Ha Noi and Khanh Hoa, and all other 
provinces which are not shown in the Figure, are still in the condition of fiscal imbalance. 
This confirms the significant role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Vietnam. 
 
Ha Noi 
Ho Chi Minh City 
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FIGURE 3
FISCAL AUTONOMY OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
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Table 4 shows the tax assignment for 2003 in Vietnam. Exclusively national 
government’s taxes include export–import duties and excise tax. The taxes shared between 
the national and subnational governments comprise value added tax; corporate income tax; 
and personal income tax. Many minor taxes are fully assigned as the owned taxes for SNGs, 
such as tax on transfers of properties, licence tax, agricultural tax; land and housing tax; tax 
on land use rights; and etc. Table 4 reveals that almost two-thirds of total government tax 
revenue is generated by shared taxes. As national taxes account for one-third of the total 
revenue, it can be seen that fiscal arrangements in Vietnam are in fact highly centralised. 
SNGs are assigned with many different taxes, but they generate only 3% total tax revenue. 





APPROXIMATE TAX ASSIGNMENT IN VIETNAM IN 2003 
Item  Percent of total tax 
revenue 
A. National taxes    
Export - Import Duties  24   
Excise Tax  9   
Subtotal   33 
B. Shared taxes    
Value Added Tax  30   
Corporate Income Tax  31   





Personal Income Tax  3   
Subtotal   64 
C. Subnational taxes    
Licence Tax, etc.  1.6   
Tax on transfers of properties  1.4   
Subtotal   3 
Total   100 
        
Source: IMF Country Report No. 03/382 & author's calculations.   
 
3.  Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
 
Like other developing countries, Vietnam suffers from the fiscal imbalance in both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. The country has an implicit system of equalisation 
grants, although it is very partial in character. Fiscal equalisation has been applied in 
Vietnam with two main components: the expected revenue and the minimum expenditure 
need of local governments. Expected revenues for SNGs are determined by the subnational 
branch of tax administration, say, from Ho Chi Minh City Tax Department, on the basis of 
the actual revenue collections of the previous years, taking into account changes in tax 
policies in the year; and expected economic growth rate during the year. In addition, 
minimum expenditure needs are calculated on the basis of the expenditure norms 
determined by the national government (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). The difference between 
expected revenue and minimum expenditure need for specific city or province will lay the 
foundation for the national government to decide the sharing rates which are applied to 
revenue from the shared taxes between national and local government. With one city or 
province, if its expected revenue (revenue from both owned source and shared taxes) is less 
than its minimum expenditure need, this city or province is allowed to keep all proceeds 
from shared taxes at local budget. This means that the local region is eligible to keep all tax 
revenue arising within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, with the well-endowed region 
where its expected revenue is greater than its minimum expenditure need, revenue from 
shared taxes must be transferred to the state budget at the rate to be centrally determined. 
These calculations will be kept unchanged for the stability period from 3 to 5 years. For 
example, in 2002, the allocation rates of shared tax revenue to SNGs vary with Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi receiving 24% and 30% shared tax revenue, respectively; whereas 
other less well endowed provinces received all 100% of shared tax revenue, except for Baria 
– Vung Tau (48%), Binh Duong (52%) and Dong Nai (53%). The current regime in 
Vietnam, in a serious sense, is not a real system of fiscal equalisation because the gap 
among provinces is still large after equalisation.  
  TABLE 5 
  FISCAL AUTONOMY OF SELECTED PROVINCES AND CITIES IN VIET NAM IN 2002 




(Bil. VND)  Owned taxes  Shared taxes  Owned and 




1  Ha Noi  3,188,420 986,734 1,796,224 2,782,958      1,516,082              4,299,040 
2  Hai Phong  1,316,180 341,555 662,350 1,003,905         624,564              1,628,469 
3  Da Nang  751,700 373,299 420,008 793,307         337,764              1,131,071  14
4  Khanh Hoa  773,700 310,038 297,393 607,431         427,780              1,035,211 
5  Ho Chi Minh City  5,137,430 4,144,416 2,178,631 6,323,047         602,331              6,925,378 
6  Dong Nai  1,207,000 493,872 720,531 1,214,403         318,941              1,533,344 
7  Binh Duong  691,880 332,051 398,763 730,814         241,374                 972,188 
8  Ba Ria Vung Tau  1,111,430 347,127 1,205,785 1,552,912         295,891              1,848,803 
9  Can Tho  947,530 345,232 369,807 715,039         412,229              1,127,268 
Source: Martinez-Vazquez (2004, p. 29).        
 
There are two basic types of intergovernmental grants in Vietnam, unconditional and 
conditional. For conditional transfers, there are two different types. The first is for the 
implementation of national programs such as Program on Hunger Eradication and Poverty 
Reduction; Program on Education and Training. The second type of conditional grants is to 
particular province(s) and is allocated at the national government’s discretion. In addition, 
Vietnam does not have an explicit separate system of capital transfers. Funds for capital 
investment are tailored in the equalisation transfer and are basically very limited (Martinez-
Vazquez, 2004). 
 
4.  Subnational borrowings 
 
In the case of Vietnam, mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments is 
significant even after fiscal equalisation from the national government. As a result, 
subnational borrowings are, in some cases, important. Current practice in Vietnam shows 
that provincial governments are allowed to borrow from domestic sources by issuing bonds. 
However, these borrowings are closely supervised by the national government. The only 
exclusion from international borrowing applies to Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi and Haiphong – 
the three largest cities in Vietnam. However, even in these cases, direct overseas borrowing 
is not permitted. The city’s government looks for a source of fund, negotiates terms and 
conditions and then requests the national government to undertake the borrowings and on 
lending to the respective city.    
 




To date, studies of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth have only undertaken very crude measures of fiscal decentralisation. Oates (1972) 
used the national government share in total public revenue as the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation. Woller and Phillips (1998) measure fiscal decentralisation as one out of 
four scenarios as follows: (1) the ratio of local government revenues to total government 
revenues; (2) the ratio of local government revenues less grants-in-aid to total government 
revenues; (3) the ratio of local government expenditures to total government expenditures 
and (4) the ratio of local government expenditures to total government expenditures less 
defence and social security expenditures. Davoodi and Zou (1998) measured the level of 
fiscal decentralisation as the spending by SNGs as a fraction of total government spending.   
 
It is widely admitted that the measurement of fiscal decentralisation on previous works 
is problematic because of “from lack of details on expenditure autonomy and own-source  15
revenue to deficiencies regarding reported data for the sub-national levels and information 
scarcity for analysing dispersion among sub-national regions” (Breuss and Eller, 2004, 
p.12). In fact, the above measures are inadequate because fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
importance of SNGs has not been properly taken into consideration. As a result, the 
theoretical literature is extended in this study by developing and applying a fiscal 
decentralisation index (“FDI”) to make systematic international comparisons of nations’ 
degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
 
2.  Establishment of the formula to calculate the fiscal decentralisation index 
 
There are two main components included in the formula of FDI in this paper: 
 
* Component 1: Fiscal autonomy for subnational governments 
This component will represent the ratio between the owned source revenue (OSR) 
over its expenditure (E) for particular subnational government. This ratio can be seen as the 
level of vertical fiscal imbalance between the national government and SNGs.  It is however 
noted that both definitions of “owned source revenue” and “expenditure” of SNGs can 
provide misleading indicator of its fiscal autonomy, and in turn, the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation of the country. Also, a simple ratio like this is partial, as it misses many 
factors that impact on fiscal decentralisation. Consequently, an adjustment factor (AF) is 
required to account for institutional constraints on fiscal events, such as the fiscal autonomy 
and fiscal importance over the four main areas of fiscal decentralisation and will be 
discussed further in the following sections (Section V.3).  
 
As a consequence, the relative level of autonomy, which can be called “fiscal 




















where OSRi represents for the owned source revenue for subnational region i; Ei represents 
for the expenditure made by subnational region i; AF represents the adjustment factor for 
the country under review; and n is the number of subnational regions. 
 
The above formula is expected to reflect the true picture of the degree of SNGs’ 
autonomy – the very important characteristic of appropriate definition of fiscal 
decentralisation. However, the formula does not yet indicate the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation because it only shows the degree of autonomy of SNGs, not the level of 
fiscal activity by SNGs relative to all public fiscal activity. 
 
* Component 2: Fiscal importance of SNGs 












 ,  (2) 
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where TE represents total public sector expenditures of the whole economy (including both 
expenditures from the national government and all SNGs). 
 
  This formula shows the fiscal importance of SNGs in the field of spending for the 
whole economy. For example, what would we conclude regarding the degree of autonomy 
of subnational region R when its owned source revenue and its expenditure are both 10 
units, when its adjustment factor is unity whereas total national revenue and expenditure are 
both 1,000 units. If equation (1) is used, we would conclude that a FDI′ is equal to unity, 
so that this region has achieved a highest possible level of fiscal decentralisation. However, 
this is not the case as the national government still retains all taxing and spending decisions.  
 
The fiscal decentralisation index 
To overcome the above problem, we need to use equations (1) and (2) simultaneously 
to give a reliable index. It is provisionally proposed that the index be the geometric mean of  
FDI′ and FDI′′ : 
 






















            (3) 
      (A)   (B) 
If we exclude the role of the adjustment factor AF in equation (3), as components (A) 
and (B) are to be both positive fractions, we can conclude that FDI will also be a positive 
fraction. Also, the higher the value of FDI, the more fiscally decentralised is the country. 
 
3.  Elements to be considered for the adjustment factor 
 
Now we turn to the question of the value of the adjustment factor AF. The size of 
fiscal decentralisation index (FDI) will also depend on the size of the adjustment factor. 
Because of the value assigned for each element and the method of calculating the value of 
the AF, it is expected that the value of FDI will vary within the range from 0 to 1. The 
higher the value of the FDI, the higher the degree of fiscal decentralisation.   
 
The elements noted in Table 6 below need to be accounted for when deriving the 
adjustment factor. In the first instance, the scale of 0 to 1 will be assigned to each important 
element with 0 represents as the lowest level (the worst) and 1 represents as the highest 
level (the best) in terms of decentralisation of the element being considered. The adjustment 
factor in equation (1) will be calculated as a simple average of the assessments for the four 
elements in Table 6. However, in the course of the subsequent research, other weightings 
and methods will be investigated.   
 
The above formula for the FDI implicitly applies the same weight to every subnational 
region of the country. This may lead to some undesirable implications, however. In the 
course of future research, the dispersion of the size of SNGs will be considered. Where the 
country consists of many subnational regions of substantially different size in terms of 
population, land area, total revenue and expenditure, etc., it may be necessary to assign each 
region a different weight, rather than weight them all equally. Another way of proceeding  17
would be to modify the FDI so that it reflects this dispersion by including in it another term 
that is the function of the standard deviation of the shares.  18
TABLE 6 
ELEMENTS OF THE ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 
Score Level  Criteria 
  Factor 1:  Autonomy on expenditure decisions  to various levels of governments 
0  Very low  All spending areas are set by the national government and SNGs must follow the instructions. 
0.25  Low  Unclear assignments of responsibilities with limited areas that SNGs can decide to spend on. 
0.5  Moderate  Clear assignments of responsibilities with spending standards are set by the national government. 
0.75  High  SNGs are basically able to decide their spending decisions with limited guides from the national 
government. 
1  Very high  SNGs decide all their spending decisions without any intervention from the national government 
and this autonomy is assured by the Constitutions and/ or laws. 
  Factor 2:  The degree of autonomy of various levels of governments to set tax bases and tax 
rates 
0  Very low  National government sets SNGs’ tax bases and rates; 
0.25  Low  Significant portion of SNGs’ budget comes from share taxes and the sharing rate is 
predetermined. SNGs can set bases and/ or rates for fees, users’ charges only. 
0.5  Moderate  SNGs are allowed to set either tax bases or rates or “piggy-backing” is possible. 
0.75  High  All bases and rates for SNGs taxes are set by SNGs within a band set by the national 
government. 
1  Very high  SNGs set all bases and rates for their taxes which generate significant amount of revenue. 
  Factor 3:  Responsibilities of SNGs for borrowing and conditions for local governments to 
access to capital markets 
0  Very low  No subnational borrowings are allowed. 
0.25  Low  SNGs can arrange for domestic borrowings with administration and veto in the hands of the 
national government. 
0.5  Moderate  SNGs can arrange borrowings from both domestic and overseas sources but all borrowings must 
satisfy strict requirements from the national government. 
0.75  High  Borrowing from any sources is acceptable given some economic regulations are met. 
1  Very high  SNGs can arrange borrowings as they wish and the capital market itself will decide whether or 
not the borrowing is given. 
  Factor 4:  Intergovernmental fiscal transfers across levels of governments 
0  Very low  Ad hoc decision from the national government with rooms for political lobby and negotiation. 
0.25  Low  Fiscal transfers are almost all conditional on their use and they are decided on a yearly basis. 
0.5  Moderate  All types of fiscal transfers are clearly regulated with a stability period. 
0.75  High  Formula has been used and a combination of conditional and unconditional transfers is available.  
1  Very  high  Clear and developed regimes for unconditional fiscal transfers have been set up and 




VI.  Preliminary values for the fiscal decentralisation index 
 
1.  Values assigned for each factor of the adjustment factor for Vietnam 
 
In accordance with suggested standard elements of the adjustment factor as discussed 
above, current practices in Vietnam in terms of the assignment of responsibility, taxing 
power assignment, SNGs borrowings and fiscal transfers can be summarised as follows. 
TABLE 7 
ADJUSTMENT FACTOR FOR VIETNAM 




  After the introduction of Budget law, provincial and local governments assumed major new expenditure 
responsibilities. 
  However, most of the items on this list are perhaps more analogous to sectors that they are functions per se. 
Basically, expenditure responsibilities are vaguely defined. 
 
0.25  19
2    Clear assignments of revenues between the national government and local governments as regulated in the 
State budget law;  
  The national government set all tax bases (except Land tax from 2005) and rates for all taxes that generate 
significant revenue for the state budget as the whole. Main source of revenue for local governments comes 
from shared tax with the national government. 
 
0.25 
3    Provincial governments can access domestic borrowings, except for there largest cities to borrow from 
overseas sources; 
  All borrowings must be approved and supervised by the cental government. 
 
0.25 
4    Formula has been used in fiscal equalisation in Vietnam and there are two types of grants in Vietnam. 
Besides   the unconditional transfers, there are two types of conditional grants in Vietnam: 
*  The first type of conditional transfers is for the implementation of national programs such as Program 
on Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction; Program on Education and Training; and so on; 
*  The second type of grants is the conditional transfer to particular province(s). 
  Vietnam does not have an explicit separate system of capital transfers. Funds for capital investment are 




Simple Average  0.25 
 
2.  Preliminary results of fiscal decentralisation index for selected countries 
 
2.1  Sample of countries  
 
The main purpose of this research is to establish the fiscal decentralisation index for 
both developing countries as well as developed economies to facilitate subsequent and 
hopefully definitive, investigations of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth in the later part. It is therefore decided that countries from The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and The Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are to be selected. In order to measure the dispersion of 
political institutions, both federal and unitary counties are considered. Due to an 
unavailability of information and data, some countries are only selected. From high income 
OECD, for federal nations, the sample consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Switzerland and The United States of America. Representative unitary countries 
from OECD includes Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Finally, for ASEAN, a mixture of federal 
and unitary countries is considered. Malaysia is the federal country and the selected unitary 
countries are Indonesia, Thailand, The Philippines and Vietnam. 
 
2.2  Results 
TABLE 8 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX OF SELECTED OECD & ASEAN COUNTRIES 
                   


















            OSRi E i TE  AF  FDI' FDI''  FDI 
                 
1  Australia  2002 Mil AUD        123,776         124,550           323,603   0.81            0.81              0.38   0.56  
2  Austria  2002 Mil Euro          41,020           39,501           127,435   0.63            0.65              0.31   0.45  
3  Belgium  2001 Mil Euro          51,655           50,001           162,067   0.69            0.71              0.31   0.47  
4  Canada  2002 Mil CAD        318,537         324,082           540,334   0.94            0.92              0.60   0.74  
5  Germany  2002 Mil Euro        410,300         443,700        1,125,000   0.75            0.69              0.39   0.52   20
6  Switzerland  2001 M. Franc        105,575         105,216           185,714   0.81            0.82              0.57   0.68  
7  United States  2001 Mil USD     2,022,530      2,040,100        3,997,940   0.88            0.87              0.51   0.67  
                   
8  Czech Republic  2002 M. Koruny        228,082         241,823        1,176,090   0.63            0.59              0.21   0.35  
9  Denmark  2002 M. Kroner        459,170         462,221           953,389   0.75            0.75              0.48   0.60  
10 France  2001 Mil Euro        148,147         146,049           832,789   0.69            0.70              0.18   0.35  
11 Hungary  2002 M. Forint     2,072,600      2,196,700        9,978,300   0.50            0.47              0.22   0.32  
12 Italy  2000 Mil Euro        164,618         162,934           613,024   0.50            0.51              0.27   0.37  
13 Japan  2001 Bil JPY        100,004           97,432           306,192   0.56            0.58              0.32   0.43  
14 Netherlands  2002 Mil Euro          71,196           71,940           259,676   0.63            0.62              0.28   0.41  
15 Spain  2000 Mil Euro          87,482           89,716           288,994   0.56            0.55              0.31   0.41  
16 Sweden  2001 M. Kroner        561,400         566,500        1,415,100   0.75            0.74              0.40   0.55  
17 United Kingdom  2002 Mil GBP        118,238         116,610           510,706   0.56            0.57              0.23   0.36  
                   
18  Malaysia  1997  M. Ringgit          10,046           13,129             68,610   0.50            0.38              0.19   0.27  
19  Indonesia  1999  Mil Rp   29,824,054    27,164,553    225,874,000   0.44            0.48              0.12   0.24  
20  Thailand  2002  Mil BHT        161,800         137,800        1,464,400   0.44            0.51              0.09   0.22  
21  The Philippines  2000  Mil Peso        138,325         127,925           638,665   0.56            0.61              0.20   0.35  
22  Vietnam  2002  Bil VND          65,823           64,573           148,208   0.25            0.25              0.44   0.33  
                                
 
There are, of course, many factors that contribute to economic growth and fiscal 
decentralisation (the fiscal arrangement between the national and subnational governments) 
will only be one of them. Nevertheless, it is still expected that there is a direct link between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic growth which will be further explored in the future. A 
description of this relationship is evident from Figure 4, which combines the FDIs and the 
average annual growth rates for selected countries from OECD and ASEAN for the period 
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For a more accurate view, the groups of countries of OECD and ASEAN as 
represented for developed and developing countries, respectively, are considered in Figures 
5 and 6. 
FIGURE 4 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 





























FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH – OECD COUNTRIES 
FIGURE 6 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH – ASEAN COUNTRIES 
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At this stage, when two groups of countries are separately considered, from Figures 5 
and 6, fiscal decentralisation is positively correlated with economic growth. That is: (i) for 
developed OECD economies, countries with more fiscal decentralised arrangement have 
generally experienced higher economic growth rates for the period (such as Australia, 
Canada and The US); and (ii) for developing ASEAN economies, the same conclusion is 
evident (such as Vietnam and Malaysia). 
    
VII. Concluding  remarks 
 
The FDIs developed in section IV reflect the expected various degrees of fiscal 
decentralisation between unitary and federal countries, and between developed and 
developing economies. It is clear that the degree of fiscal decentralisation in federal 
countries is generally higher than that of unitary countries since their SNGs’ responsibilities 
and powers are often assured by their constitutions (this guarantee cannot basically be found 
in the constitutions of unitary countries).  Also, with developed countries, their subnational 
governments are more advanced in terms of managerial capability and experience in 
comparison with developing countries. As a result, fiscal decentralisation is expected to 
occur at a larger extent in these developed countries. 
 
Vietnam has a low FDI, even though the fiscal importance of SNGs is the highest of 
ASEAN countries. This is because SNGs in Vietnam have the lowest degree of fiscal 
autonomy of all ASEAN economies. However, further research, using the FDIs developed 
in this paper (which, unlike other indices, account for both fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
importance of SNGs), is required to confirm the positive link between fiscal decentralisation 
and growth. If confirmed, Vietnam should be encouraged to haste its fiscal decentralisation 
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